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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This study gives insight into the relationship between the sports environment of major 
leagues1 and the economies of 30 metropolitan areas in the U.S over the period 1990-2006. As 
sports facilities and franchises tend to be heavily subsidized by the public sector, that is, 
through money collected from taxpayers, it seems interesting to investigate the impact of 
franchises and facilities on real personal income. 
 
In addition to a brief introduction and literature review on how sports franchises affect the 
economy of a region, an empirical model is estimated that examines the importance of the 
entry and exit of professional baseball, basketball and football franchises along with the 
construction of arenas and stadia, and sports related variables on city per capita incomes. 
 
Like many existing studies, the empirical results indicate that sports franchises have only little 
effect on real per capita income. Additionally, the creation of one single workplace in the 
sports environment is associated with a cost of roughly $200000 casting doubt on the efficacy 
of using public funds to subsidize sports franchises and venues in order to enhance economic 
growth.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Major League is a term to refer to the highest division in team sports in the U.S. The major leagues consist of: MLB (Major League 
Baseball), MLS (Major League Soccer), NBA (National Basketball Association), NFL (National Football League) and NAHL (National 
Hockey League).   
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1.  Introduction  
 
 
U.S state governments have invested in the playing facilities used by professional sports 
teams with the hope of producing a set of tangible and intangible benefits. The past 15 to 20 
years have given rise to an almost unprecedented building boom involving new stadiums and 
arenas for professional sports teams.2 Forty six major league stadiums and arenas were built 
or renovated for teams in the four principal professional U.S. sports leagues between 1990 
and 1998 with more than $21.7 billion being spent on sports facilities. Public coffers 
contributed up to two-thirds of this amount.  In 2002, at least 60% of the 120 plus major 
sports franchises were playing their home games in a facility built or remodelled since 1991, 
with average construction costs in excess of $175 million for an arena and $300 million for a 
stadium. The building boom initiated during the 1990s reflects a sports facility construction 
cycle of around 30 years. Thus, the beginning of a new construction cycle around the year 
2020 will be anticipated .3  
 
The focus of this paper is on investigating whether it is economically reasonable for a 
metropolitan area to subsidize sports franchises or facilities in order to enhance the local 
economy. To do so, I will investigate the impact of sports franchises and facilities on the real 
per capita income of metropolitan area citizens. 
 
1.1 Cities and Subsidies4 
 
Local politicians and owners of sports teams often claim that professional sports facilities and 
franchises are important engines of economic development in metropolitan areas, contributing 
millions of dollars of new spending and creating hundreds of new jobs (see Table 1.1). So far, 
economists have found little empirical support for a positive economic impact of professional 
sports teams and facilities on urban economies in terms of real income.5 Given that at least 
two years have passed since the most recent study I have researched, it seems timely to return 
to this issue. 
                                                 
2
 Quirk and Fort (1999), p. 140 
3
 Kennedy and Rrosentraub (2000), p.436; Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), p.95 
4
 For details and implications of the theoretical model see Owen (2003) 
5
 Coates and  Humphreys (2003), p. 335 
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Table 1.1 Claimed Benefits by Pro Stadium Impact Studies 
Year of 
Study 
Metropolitan 
area 
Team 
(League) 
Annual 
economic 
impact 
($mil) 
Annual 
personal 
earnings 
($mil) 
Permanent 
jobs 
created 
State/local 
taxes 
($mil) 
Total impact 
of 
construction 
($mil)  
Construction 
jobs created 
         
1998 Phoenix 
Diamondbac
ks (MLB) 319 - 4110 14.9 694 4626 
1999 Hartford 
Patriots 
(NFL) 171 71 2757 15.6 - - 
1999 Boston 
Red Sox 
(MLB) - 
current 
stadium 120 - 1597 - - - 
  
Red Sox 
(MLB) - 
new stadium 186 - 2629 - 492 4769 
1999 
Washington/Ba
ltimore 
Ravens 
(NFL) 202 96 2772 11.6 - - 
1999 San Antonio 
Spurs 
(NBA) 77 43 - 3.3 372 - 
2000 Green Bay 
Packers 
(NFL) 144 89 1620 9.6 - - 
2000 Houston 
Rockets 
(NBA) 187 91 2400 13.0 - - 
2001 Kansas City 
Chiefs 
(NFL) & 
Royals 
(MLB) 328 218 4418 19.8 - - 
         
    
                                                    Source: Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001), p.59 
 
It is a legitimate question to ask why governments grant such subsidies to sports franchises. 
Cities or local governments hope to stimulate economic development and regional 
recreational patterns through the presence of a professional sports franchise. In some instances, 
however, the public cost for each job created in the area adjacent to a facility has exceeded 
$200000, easily exceeding the costs of creating a job when governments invest in other jobs.6 
The aim of the public sector is to minimize the subsidy, ensure revenue streams generated by 
the team to repay debt and operating expenses caused by the construction of a facility, and 
enjoy intangible benefits from a team in the community.7 For local residents to be willing to 
pay a subsidy to a sports team there must be some benefit that the team cannot capture. Those 
sources of benefit might include: economic growth, job creation, civic pride, and consumer 
surplus.8 
 
City subsidies granted to sports teams are usually based on claims by stadium proponents that 
teams provide a public good element to them that teams themselves are not able to capture 
through ticket sales, broadcasting contracts, etc. The existences of intangible benefits, such as 
                                                 
6
 Kennedy and Rosentraub (2000), p. 437 
7
 Kennedy and Rosentraub (2000), p.441 
8
 Owen (2003), pp. 187-188 
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civic pride, and so on are acknowledged by economists. Whether the value of the external 
benefits of a major league team to consumers really does exceed stadium subsidies is 
uncertain, but by no means implausible.9  
 
The number of teams that exist is determined by the groups of owners that have joined 
together to form the four major professional sports leagues. Each league seeks to ensure that 
there is at least one region (and perhaps two or three) that does not have a team. These regions 
become the “chasers,” offering teams generous incentive packages to encourage them to 
relocate into their metropolitan area.10 The key to team owners' negotiating power is their 
ability to control the geographic mobility of franchises as well as the authority to anoint new 
franchises.11  
 
Table 1.2 MLB Teams Seeking New Facilities in the 1980s and  1990s 
League/Team Situation Resolution 
    
Arizona 
Diamondbacks New stadium part of expansion bid  $238 million subsidy from county (sales tax) 
Atlanta Braves Sought new stadium Moved into remodelled Olympic Stadium 
Baltimore Orioles Demanded new stadium Camden Yards, $200+ million subsidy in 1992 
Chicago White Sox Threatened to move to Florida New stadium in 1991, 100% public subsidy 
Cincinnati Reds Threatened to move to Florida New stadium approved in 1996, $250+ million subsidy 
Cleveland Indians Threatened to move out of region New stadium in 1994, $150+ million subsidy 
Colorado Rockies New stadium part of expansion bid $215 million subsidy (sales tax)  
Detroit Tigers Threatened to move to suburbs 
New stadium approved in 1997; $240 million public 
subsidy 
Houston Astros Threatened to leave the region 
New stadium approved in 1997; $180+ million public 
subsidy 
Milwaukee Brewers Threatened to leave the region 
New stadium approved in 1997; $250+ million public 
subsidy 
Minnesota Twins Threatened to move to North Carolina 
Plan for new stadium rejected in North Carolina; 
Unresolved 
Montreal Expos Threatening to move New Ballpark unlikely in Montreal  
New York Mets Requesting new ballpark Unresolved 
 
New York Yankees Threatening to leave New York City Unresolved 
 
Philadelphia Phillies Requesting new stadium Unresolved 
 
Pittsburgh Pirates Threatening to leave the region New stadium plan approved; $100+ million subsidy 
San Diego Padres Seeking new ballpark $275 million public investment 
 
San Francisco Giants Threatened to move to Florida New private stadium 
 
Seattle Mariners Demanded new stadium $360 million public subsidy for new stadium 
Tampa Bay Devil 
Rays Stadium part of bid 
City paid for stadium in 1990 and renovations in 1997-
1998 
Texas Rangers Threatened to leave Arlington New stadium in 1994, $135 million public subsidy  
Toronto Blue Jays New stadium opened in 1989 Public subsidy in excess of $262 million (Canadian) 
    
  
                        Source: Kennedy and Rosentraub (2000), p.442 
 
                                                 
9
 Noll and Zimbalist (1997b), p. 58; also see Baade and Dye (1990) 
10
 Kennedy and Rosentraub (2000) pp. 437-439,  Piraino (1996), pp. 1677-1678 
11
 Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), p.99; also see Kennedy and Rosentraub (2000). 
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Measuring the value of a team to a city is much more difficult than measuring the value to its 
owners, as measuring the surplus value of a sports franchise to the fan will face empirical 
obstacles. Revenues that teams earn through ticket sales and other sources such as broadcast 
rights fees do not completely reflect the value of the team to local area residents. However, 
owners of sports franchises have been successful in absorbing portions of the consumer 
surplus, as they frequently received subsidies if threatened to relocate to another metropolitan 
area.12 Basically, the battle over stadium funding can be viewed as a bargaining problem 
between teams and cities.13 Even though the presence of a professional sports franchise is 
associated with huge public expenses, cities are willing to offer big incentive packages (see 
Table 1.2). 
  
1.2.  Costs vs. Benefits 
 
This chapter examines the costs and benefits to cities resulting from subsidizing professional 
sports facilities in order to find out whether the proliferation of public investments in 
professional sports venues can be justified. These benefits can be identified through a cost-
benefit analysis.14 Stadium proponents claim that hosting professional franchises enhances the 
local economy in terms of job creation and further increase the local tax revenue. Also an 
improvement in quality of life is stated as another form of benefit. In contrast, the costs, 
namely stadium subsidies, can account for two thirds of the actual construction costs. As 
intangible benefits are difficult to measure, I will focus on the effects in terms of job creation 
and tax revenue and review some of the existing studies that have undertaken such an analysis. 
    
A common measure of economic activity is to look at the creation of new jobs. Correlations 
across metropolitan areas among population, employment, wages, and house values observed 
in order to assess how much a metropolitan area benefits from net job creation caused by a 
professional sports environment.15  
 
Economists have estimated metropolitan area benefits to range from $0 to $1500 per net job 
created and the number of jobs created is estimated to be less than 1000 (see Table 1.3). Even 
                                                 
12
 Owen (2003), pp. 187-188 
13
 Owen (2003), p. 184 
14
 See Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001); Hamilton and Kahn (1997) 
15
 See Coates and Humphreys (2001); Baade and Sanderson (1997) 
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if the benefit is at its upper bound estimate of $1500, the total benefit still is insignificant to a 
metropolitan area. Another source of benefits is increased tax revenue that may arise from 
hosting a team. Imported sales tax revenue benefits the local area by reducing the amount of 
taxes necessary to be raised from local residents. To estimate the amount of imported sales tax, 
the number of nonlocal fans who visit to attend sports games must be estimated and 
multiplied by the fans’ estimated average spending in the sports environment. Assuming an 
extremely high local sales tax rate of 5 percent suggests that hosting a sports team imports 
from $696000 per year for an NHL team to $1.5 million for NFL teams. Some metropolitan 
areas hosting professional sports teams also levy local income taxes. Applying a 2 percent 
income tax rate to the estimated team payroll suggests that increased local income taxes range 
from $868000 per year for NHL teams to $1.4 million per year for NFL teams. The assumed 2 
percent income tax represents the upper bound at which local governments tax income. 
Indeed, many teams play in metropolitan areas where no income taxes are levied.16  
 
 
Table 1.3 Net Job Creation Effect of a Professional Sports Team (Estimate)  
Number of net jobs created 0 to 1000 
Benefit per net job created $0 to $1500 
 
Baseline annual benefit (500 jobs * $750 benefit per job) $375000 
 
                                                                                           Source: Rappaport and Wilkenson (2001), p.65 
 
 
Adding together all the aforementioned benefits, the benefits of hosting a professional 
franchise range from $1.9 million per year for an NHL team to $2.9 million per year for an 
NFL team. In order to compare benefits and costs, the benefits are converted into net present 
values. The question being here is the willingness of a metropolitan to spend for each dollar of 
annual benefit while hosting a franchise. The estimated value of the combined benefits from a 
franchise ranges from $26.7 million to $40.3 million. In contrast, the average public 
contribution for the 17 football and baseball stadiums built between 1994 and 2004 accounted 
for $188 million and for the 19 basketball and hockey arenas, the average public share was 
$84 million17 (see Table 1.4).  
 
                                                 
16
 Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001); pp. 61-68 
17
 Those outlays further support aforementioned calculations of costs required to create a workplace in the sports environment. $188 million 
(public costs)/ 1000 (jobs created)  = $188000  
 14 
In this calculation annual public expenses and municipal services such as the maintenance or 
operating costs of running the facility (police, fire, water costs, etc.) are not even included. 
Those costs are estimated to account for $ 5-10 million dollars, depending on the size and 
type of the sports facility. Typically the public covers 100% of these municipal services.18 
 
 
Table 1.4 Stadium/ Arena Openings and expected Benefits               
 
Number of 
facilities 
Avg. cost 
($mil) 
Avg. public 
cost ($mil) 
Public cost as 
percent of total 
1994 - 2000 new     
NFL/MLB 17 286 188 66 
NBA/NHL 19 185 84 45 
     
2001-04 new     
NFL/MLB 15 366 230 63 
NBA/NHL 3 225 114 51 
     
Estimates Of Jobs And Tax Benefits, 2000 Season 
Baseline annual benefit value (% of total 
job + tax benefit): NFL MLB NBA NHL 
     
Net job creation benefit 
$375000 
(12.8%) 
$375000 
(12.9%) 
375000 
(17.8%) $375000 (19.3%) 
Imported sales tax benefit 
$1134000 
(38.7%) 
$1537000 
(53.0%) 
$732000 
(34.7%) $696000 (35.9%) 
Increased income tax benefit 
1418000 
(48.4%) 
$990000 
(34.1%) 
$1000000 
(47.5%) $868000 (44.8%) 
Total annual benefit value $2927000 $2902000 $2107000 $ 1939000 
     
Net present value of jobs and tax benefits 
from hosting a team for 30 years using 6% 
interest rate (annual benefit times 13.76) $40275520 $39921520 $28992320 $26680640 
     
 
                        Source: Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001); pp. 57-59 
 
It is obvious that costs for most sports facility projects exceed the above estimated benefits by 
far. Further the baseline values estimated rather overestimate the benefits, as many local areas 
tax spending below 5 percent. Rappaport and Wilkerson suggest that the net present value of 
the jobs and tax benefits may be no more than $5 to $10 million from hosting a major league 
team.  The benefit to a city from increased economic activity such as job creation and 
increased tax revenues falls far short of the public outlays needed to attract professional sports 
franchises. Nevertheless, subsidies for sports franchises still seem to grow. Hence, there must 
be some other benefits from hosting a professional sports team which an analysis focusing on 
economic activity and tax revenue is not able to capture and highlight.19 
                                                 
18
 Long (2005), pp.15-16 
19
 Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001); pp. 57-58; 68-77 
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2.  Economic Impact Studies assessing the Sports Environment     
 
 
Economic impact analysis (EIA) estimates changes in economic activity within a region 
caused by actions such as hosting sport events, or building a production facility.20 Broadly 
speaking, there are two common methods of conducting EIA. These are discussed briefly 
below: 
 
2.1  Economic Impact Analysis: Introduction and Theory 
 
Ex ante economic impact studies in respect to the sports environment are applied to estimate 
the number of visitors/admissions an event/franchise/facility is expected to draw, the number 
of days each spectator is expected to stay and the amount of money visitors will spend. Also, 
one can compare economies of cities/regions where the sports environment has changed with 
that of cities where it has not changed. From these estimates, a direct economic impact is 
derived. Subject to a multiplier, an indirect economic impact can be further estimated.21 The 
multiplier is a scaling factor that links dollars spent directly on pro sports to a net effect on the 
entire local economy among other factors.22 However, ex ante studies suffer from theoretical 
deficiencies namely the substitution effect and effects of leakage. 
 
 
The Substitution Effect: The majority of consumers have a relatively inflexible leisure 
budget. If sports team moves to town, the money one spend taking a family to a game 
typically is money that is not spent on other forms of entertainment and leisure. Many Impact 
analysis studies ignore reductions in spending on other forms of entertainment due to 
substitution in private spending.23 Only spending that would not have occurred in the absence 
of the sports franchise should be included as part of the initial economic impact. Further, out 
of state fans at sporting events might come to town with the game not being their main reason. 
Rather, their visit is based on business reasons or other forms of leisure. If not at the game, 
                                                 
20
 Chang (2001), p.3. 
21
 Baade et al. (2008),   Coates and Humphreys (1999),  p.2 
22
 Coates and Humphreys (1999), p. 602; The U.S Department of commerce maintains RIMS II, a set of multipliers for each industry in each 
state of the union. The RIMS II multipliers are designed to take all leakages, taxes and imports into account.  Sporting events are categorized 
as part of hotels, lodging places and amusement industries. Source: Hefner (1990), p.8 
23
 Coates and Humphreys (2003), p. 342 
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they would spend their money on other forms of entertainment in the city.24 To strengthen 
these observations, little or no increase in hotel occupancy rates, retail sales, or airport traffic 
was reported in cities that hosted Super Bowls or the Olympic Games in the U.S. in the past 
ten years.25 
 
Leakages: Approximately 55 to 60 percent of NHL, NBA, NFL and MLB team revenues go 
to player salaries, which is regulated in the collective bargaining agreement. With variations 
in league payroll rules, when team revenues rise after relocating, a big share of the revenue 
goes directly to the athletes. The remaining 40 to 45 percent goes to the owners or is 
necessary to cover the costs associated with the new facility. Players and owners usually face 
the top federal marginal tax rate at 39.6 percent, further they are taxed an additional 1.45 
percent for Medicare. Hence, more than 40 percent of their income leaks directly to 
Washington, D.C. High incomes also lead to higher savings rates, with athletes’ salaries 
leaking out of the local economy and into the world's money markets. Also, more often than 
not, players do not choose the local community as their permanent residence, and owners 
tend not to do so either. Further, food prices at sporting venues are substantially higher than 
at alternative retail establishments, provided by a concessionaire company, which often is 
based outside the local area.26   
 
The second methodology in the literature uses cross section and/or time series data from 
metropolitan areas or regions in order to conduct a regression analysis. The economic impact 
is then assessed using ex post evaluations.27 Ex post analyses, following empirical rules of 
conduct more strictly find that ex ante studies exaggerate the benefits of mega-events often 
by up to a factor of 10. Such optimistic estimations can be explained due to ignoring the 
substitution effect, simply including spending that would occur even in the absence of sports 
events.28  The academic work on the economic impact of sports facilities and teams compares 
the local economic performance of areas with and without stadiums, arenas, and teams, 
controlling for other variables that affect local economic conditions.29   The majority of 
previous independent studies of mega-events have concentrated on data regarding personal 
income, per capita income, or employment data to estimate the ex post economic impact of 
sports. 30 
                                                 
24
 Hudson (2001), p.27 
25
 Coates and Humphreys (2003), p. 343; Hudson (2001), p.28 
26
 Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), p. 106 
27
 Coates and Humphreys (1999), p. 6 
28
 Baade et al. (2008),   Coates and Humphreys (1999),  p.2 
29
 Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), p. 104 
30 Baade et al. (2008), Coates and Humphreys (1999), Coates and Humphreys (2003), Baade and Matheson (2001), Baade and Matheson 
(2004). 
 17 
2.2  Literature Review 
 
Keating for example finds that that the presence of pro sports is not statistically significant in 
determining economic growth rates as large taxpayer expenditures for sporting facilities have 
failed to enhance economic growth and job creation.31 Michael Walden, a North Carolina 
State University economics professor, looked at the determinants of growth in jobs from 1990 
to 1994 in 46 cities and found that cities with major league sports teams have grown more 
slowly in the 1990s.32 Indeed, a study from University of Maryland economist’s Denis Coates 
and Brad Humphreys found that new stadiums and teams actually make cities poorer: their 
results show a $100 drop in per capita income for cities with new ballparks and a $400 decline 
in income for cities with new baseball teams.33 
 
In an ex ante study from 2006, Matheson estimated the direct economic benefits of the U.S. 
Open Tennis tournament in Flushing Meadows, New York at $420 million for the tri-state 
area, more than any other sports or entertainment event in any city in the United States. This 
sum represents 3% of the total annual direct economic impact of tourism for New York. It is 
hard to believe that 1 in 30 tourists visiting New York City in any given year are visiting the 
city solely to attend the U.S. Open.34 
 
Leagues, team owners, and event organizers have a strong incentive to provide economic 
impact numbers that are as large as possible in order to justify heavy public subsidies. For 
example, the National Football League (NFL) typically claims an economic impact from the 
Super Bowl of around $300 to $400 million, Major League Baseball (MLB) attaches a $60 to 
$75 million benefit to the All-Star Game, and up to almost $250 million for the World 
Series.35 
 
In contrast, Baade and Matheson’s research on the impact of the MLB All-Star Game 
suggests that employment growth in host cities was lowered by 0.38 percent in comparison to 
other cities.  They investigated employment rates and changes in the absence of the MLB All-
Star Games and then compared that estimate to actual employment levels to assess the 
                                                 
31
 Keating (1999), p. 25 
32
 See Walden (1997).  However, 7 of the 10 MSAs with the biggest projected growth rate in Gross Metropolitan Product from 2007-2012 do 
host major league franchises.   Source: http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/30/economy-cities-alabama-biz-
cx_bw_0130econcities_slide_5.html?thisSpeed=25000 
33
 see Coates and Humphreys (2001) 
34
 Matheson (2006), pp. 4-5. The methodology to obtain these estimates was not described. 
35
 Matheson (2006), p.2 
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contribution of the event. Their model included variables as deviations from city norms, 
explaining regional and metropolitan growth patterns. Therefore, they defined a regression 
analysis assessing changes in employment attributable to the All-Star Game in host cities 
between 1973 and 1997. Further, sales tax data were examined. Taxable sales are generally 
good indicators for the assessment of the economic impact of sporting events, as a direct 
relationship between sales tax collections and sports events can be observed. Further, they can 
be isolated from cumulative economies. Such isolation enables forecasts with better precision, 
as sales data can be even collected and assessed on a weekly basis and areas can be isolated 
down to city levels. The key to calculate the impact was to isolate factors common to the 
economy as a whole from factors being specific to the city being studied.  If an event such as 
the All-Star Game significantly increased economic activity in the host city, then the host 
city’s taxable sales as a percentage of taxable sales in the rest of the state increased as well. 
By comparing the city/rest-of-state ratio in an All-Star Game time period to other time periods, 
they assessed changes in taxable sales. In contrast to MLB studies claiming that an All Star 
Game increases economic activity creating up to 1000 additional jobs in the year a city hosts 
an All Star Game, Baade and Matheson’s regression analysis reported employment numbers 
to fall by roughly 8000. Further an examination on taxable sales revealed that sales have not 
only failed to increase during All-Star Games, but have on average fallen nearly $30 million 
below what would have normally been expected in these host cities.36  
 
In 1990, Robert Baade and Richard Dye assessed ex post the economic impact of stadia and 
franchises. In their model, the real aggregate personal income in a Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (SMSA) was explained by population, a time trend, and dummy variables for 
facility construction and franchise presence of baseball and football teams. Further, they 
investigated the SMSA share of regional income using the SMSA share of regional population, 
a time trend and dummy variables. Baade and Dye concluded that stadia and new franchises 
have small but negative impact on the income level of an SMSA with the one exception being 
Seattle.37  
 
Lertwachara and Cochran also confirmed negative income effects triggered by sport 
franchises in local economies in their study from 2007. Both scholars examined both the 
short-term and long-term economic impact of professional sport franchises in metropolitan 
                                                 
36
 Baade and Matheson (2001), pp. 311-322; also see Baade and Matheson (2008) 
37
 Baade and Dye (1990) 
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statistical areas.38  In their study, the impact of sports franchises on per capita income and the 
per capita growth rate was assessed using the event study model considering the MLB, NBA, 
NFL and NHL. The whole U.S. economy was taken into consideration to account for 
macroeconomic conditions that influence local economies. Further, specific characteristics of 
each local economy were included. An event was defined as the establishment of a new 
professional sports team in an MSA through expansion or relocation. They used per capita 
income at the MSA level and gross domestic product (GDP) as proxies for the local and 
overall U.S economy to estimate a linear relationship between the nation’s economy and 
economy of each MSA. In Summary, Lertwachara and Cochran focused on how an estimated 
league-wide regression equation fits a new or relocated franchise.39 The scholars provide 
evidence that a professional sports franchise significantly slows the growth rate of per capita 
income in the short run as well as in the long-run. The decrease ranges from 0.33% for a 
hockey team to 7.08% for a football team. An estimated decrease in per capita income of 
$1116.96 occurred during any franchise’s first year regardless of the sport in the MSA and 
$13901.08 during the 10-year period immediately following the establishment or relocation of 
the franchise. The linear regression analysis they conducted indicates that, in the long run, an 
additional football team increases the unexpected income by $109.99, whereas an additional 
basketball team would decrease the unexpected income by $88.14. They also found that the 
number of existing teams has no meaningful impact on the local income. In line with results 
for per capita income, the results also indicate no relationship between the growth rate of 
income and the number of existing teams. The conclusion they draw is that estimated local 
income in the presence of a professional sports franchise is lower than what would be 
estimated in the absence of a professional sports franchise.40 
 
In 1999, Coates and Humphreys investigated the effect of professional sports on local 
economies by pooling data from each city that had a professional football, baseball, or 
basketball team at any time during the period 1969 to 1995. The study used panel data 
techniques to control for city and year specific influences with respect to the level of income 
per capita by defining multiple variables to capture the entire spectrum of sport's effects on 
the local economies. Dummy variables for the entry or exit of teams within the past 10 years 
were introduced, as well as variables controlling for the construction of stadiums within the 
past ten years, followed by variables for the capacity of sport facilities in the respective cities, 
and further variables describing the presence of a team in the MLB, NBA and NFL. In order 
                                                 
38
 For details, implications of the model and methodology see Lertwachara and Cochran (2007) 
39
 Lertwachara and Cochran (2007) pp. 244-248  
40
 Lertwachara and Cochran (2007) pp. 248-253  
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to estimate the economic effect, they applied a reduced form linear model. The overall 
conclusion of their study was that the sports environment tended to reduce the per capita 
personal income in the city by a small but statistically significant amount.41 
 
Later in 2000, Coates and Humphreys examined the economic impact of strikes and lockouts 
of professional sports leagues. Again, this framework employed a linear reduced form 
empirical model which relates the level of real per capita personal income in a metropolitan 
area in a given year to a vector of variables describing the economic and business climate in 
that area during that particular year and to a vector of variables which capture the role of 
stadia and franchises in the determination of economic activity. In order to determine the 
effect of the work stoppages in professional sports on local economies, two dummy variables 
were added, one each for baseball and football strikes. Coates and Humphreys conclude that 
the evidence does not support the assertion that professional sports influence the economic 
health of SMSAs. Work stoppages in baseball and football have never had significant impact 
on local economies. The departure of a franchise in any sport, particularly in basketball, has 
never significantly lowered real per capita personal income in a metropolitan area.42 
 
Further, in 2001, Coates and Humphreys explored the impact of professional sports teams and 
stadiums on the wages of individuals employed in occupational groups closely linked to the 
sports environment in 37 U.S. cities from 1977 to 1998. Wage equations for individual 
workers employed in food service, hotel services, retail sales, or sports and recreation were 
estimated, including controls for individual characteristics and the local labour market as seen 
in typical human capital wage equations. A regression model was applied, including vectors 
of variables describing factors other than the professional sports environment that affect 
wages of individual workers (i.e. gender, race, age, educational descriptors, etc.), as well as 
variables controlling for the sports environment (i.e. presence, entry/exit of a franchise, etc.). 
They concluded that the effect of sports results in an annual average decrease in inflation 
adjusted earnings of $46.11 for workers. The results of this study confirmed conclusions of 
earlier research that the overall sports environment is statistically significantly affecting 
wages negatively.43 
 
                                                 
41
 Coates and Humphreys (2003), pp. 341. 
42
 Coates and Humphreys (2000), pp. 314-324 
43
 Coates  and Humphreys (2001), pp. 2-11 
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2.3  A critical View 
 
Many league-sponsored economic impact studies ignore the costs of hosting such an event. 
Most leagues and event organizers require sparkling new stadiums and arenas before 
awarding the privilege of hosting a mega-event to a city. Public expenditures on sports 
infrastructure and event operations necessarily entail reductions in other government services, 
an expansion of government borrowing, or an increase in taxation, all of which produce a drag 
on the local economy. While ex ante estimates often do a credible job in determining the 
economic activity that occurs as a result of a mega-event, they generally do a poor job of 
accounting for substitution effects and almost never acknowledge the problems associated 
with the application of incorrect multipliers. 44  Wassmer suggested in 2001 that an overall 
multiplier of 0.5 is more appropriate than the multiplier range of 1.5 to 2.0 usually used.45  
 
Misleading conclusions also occur when different definitions of the geographic area are 
applied for different aspects of the analysis. Some studies used small areas in order to capture 
a large amount of visitors, yet at the same time a bigger geographical area was defined in 
order to utilize a larger multiplier. An impact study of the Commonwealth Games in Victoria, 
British Columbia used such a method, considering anyone outside of the city being a tourist, 
but the entire providence was used as a sample to measure the economic impact. Thus, 
altering the geographical area of interest represents a serious flaw in the analysis, with the 
purpose to optimize numbers and exaggerate the economic impact. 46 
 
In addition to the applied multipliers in the respective studies, Table 2.1 includes two columns, 
named Locals included and Casuals included in order to reveal whether the studies are 
capturing only additional money which is coming from outside the “local” area.  In fact, most 
of the studies do include local spending, which is diverted money from other local businesses, 
as part of economic impact. Hence, a yes will appear in the Locals Included column. Given 
this situation, ignoring to highlight only the true additional cash flows coming from outside 
the local economic area, it is also unlikely that tourists are separated into those primarily 
interested in the pursuit for the sporting event per se, and those who would have visited for 
different reasons. If out of town tourists were investigated to be genuine additions to the 
tourist population, a “no” will stand in the Casuals Included column. Many studies focus on 
                                                 
44
 Matheson (2006), pp. 11-13 
45
 Wassmer (2001), p. 267. 
46
 Crompton (1995), p.24 
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the gross impact rather than the net impact, which is argued by economists to be the correct 
methodology.47  
 
Table 2.1 Economic Impact Studies and Multipliers 
Study   Multiplier 
Locals 
Included  
Casuals 
Included 
 
 
   
Mayer Hoffman McCann & Mid-America 
Regional Council (1989): Gross 
 
2.9 Yes Yes 
Mayer Hoffman McCann & Mid-America 
Regional Council (1989): Net 
 
2.9 No Yes 
Maryland Department of Economic 
Development (1987) 
 
1.9 Yes Yes 
Centre of Economic Education 1996 
 
1.7 Yes No 
Deloitte and Touche (1993): State 
 
1.9 Yes Yes 
Deloitte and Touche (1993): City 
 
1.6 Yes Yes 
City of Chicago (1986): State, new park 
 
2.0 Yes Yes 
City of Chicago (1986): City, new park 
 
1.7 Yes Yes 
Blair and Swindell (1997) 
 
1.7 No No 
Conway and Beyers (1996) 
 
1.5 No Yes 
 
  
                   Source: Hudson (2001), p.32 
 
Money being substituted from one use to another is not captured in gross impacts. Net 
impacts capture only funds that are genuinely additional. Based on the calculation of the 
initial impact being expanded further by the multiplier in order to get a final measure for the 
total economic impact, the distinction between these techniques is crucial.48 
 
Economic impact studies are powerful tools in the subsidization debate with the objective to 
determine the economic impact of the team to a local area realistically. Disappointingly, many 
violations were identified as acceptable practices in the way these studies were conducted as 
discussed earlier, with many studies being funded by leagues, pro lobby interest groups or 
local governments. The economic impact of highly paid athletes and vendors in fact is hardly 
affecting the public. Still, economic impact studies have been successful weapons in 
convincing voters, by arguing that sports teams are important economic catalysts for the 
region.49  If the goal of a municipality is to increase their citizens’ per capita income, maybe 
cities should reconsider attracting professional sports teams to their markets by spending huge 
amount of public funds.50 
                                                 
47
 Hudson (2001), p.31-33 
48
 Hudson (2001), p.27 
49
 Hudson (2001), pp. 23-37 
50
 Lertwachara and Cochran (2007), p. 253 
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3.  The Empirical Model51 
 
 
In this section, an empirical model will be constructed in order to assess the relationship 
between the presence of sports franchises and facilities and real per capita personal income 
and its growth rate in 30 U.S American Cities (Standard Metropolitan Statistic Areas) from 
1990 until 2006. Following the approach adopted in several studies conducted by Brad 
Humphreys and Dennis Coates using regression analysis, I will investigate if similar results 
can be observed with more recent data. Several variables describing the sports environment 
will be considered in order to capture the economic impact of professional sports and facilities 
on the metropolitan economy as precise as possible. 
 
 
The following questions will be addressed: 
 
 
 
1) Do sport franchises affect the level of real per capita personal income in a 
metropolitan area? 
 
 
2) Do sport franchises have an influence on the growth rate of real per 
capita personal income in a metropolitan area? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 The empirical framework in throughout chapter 3 is adopted from Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys’ collaborative publications, where 
they investigated the economic impact of sports leagues under several circumstances. I will heavily base my research on the models both 
scholars have applied and conduct research derived from their insights. For more details, see Coates and Humphreys (1999), Coates and 
Humphreys (2000), Coates and Humphreys (2003).   
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3.1  Theoretical Concept 
 
It is important to distinguish these two questions from an economic perspective as an increase 
in income in a single year may not imply a long-run impact on economic growth.52 
 
To address the first question, a linear reduced form empirical model will be used. This enables 
one to relate real per capita income (y) to variables representing the economic climate (x) and 
additionally to variables describing stadia and franchises (z) for each year (t) in each city (i). 
Hence, the model takes following form: 
 
yit = βxit + γzit +  µ i t    (1) 
 
Where β and γ are vectors to be estimated, and µ is the normal iid disturbance term. If γ is 
significantly different from zero, real per capita personal income in a metropolitan area is 
affected by the sports environment, otherwise sports franchises and facilities have no 
influence on the local economy. 
 
An alternative method to address the first question is to use the event study methodology, 
commonly used to assess the impacts of law and regulations on the value of firms in the 
finance literature.53 In this case the model is: 
 
    git =    α + βy’t + ∑γkDkit +  µ it    (2) 
 
Again, the variable (y) represents real per capita personal income, (y’) is the average real per 
capita personal income across all metropolitan areas and D is a dummy variable describing an 
event (k). 
 
The average level of income across the sampled metropolitan areas is an explanatory variable. 
An advantage of applying the event study methodology is to allow the data to determine the 
relationship between changes in real per capita personal income in the metropolitan areas with 
changes in average real per capita personal income. In this model, variables specific to the 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) are included as regressors. As the regression 
                                                 
52
 Coates and Humphreys (1999); p.3 
53
 Coates and Humphreys (1999); p.10 
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includes the average level of income across all metropolitan areas, year specific variables 
have to be omitted. To explain this, the average value of income obviously will take the same 
value for each city in a certain year. Hence, the inclusion of year specific effects would not 
allow this model to be estimated, as those variables are perfectly collinear with the average 
income variable.54  
 
For the assessment of the second question, the same models will be applied. However, this 
time, the growth rate of real per capita income will be the dependent variable in the analysis. 
While the event study model is being conducted, the average level of real per capita personal 
income will be replaced by the average growth rate of real per capita personal income as the 
explanatory variable. 
 
 
3.2  Data 
 
The data for this research covers the time period from 1990 to 2006. Income and population 
data are taken from the Regional Economic Information System, which is distributed by the 
U.S Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, available at www.bea.gov. 
Data on sports facilities are taken from www.ballparks.com. Data on the specific sports 
franchises are taken from the official websites of the respective sports leagues; www.nba.com, 
www.nfl.com and www.mlb.com. 
 
Thirty SMSAs are included in the sample, each of which hosted at least one major league 
franchise during the sample period, though in most cases the sampled cities host multiple 
major league sports franchises. The explanatory variables also include the lagged level of real 
per capita income or the growth rate of real per capita income, as well as the level of 
population change. Dummy variables specific to the metropolitan area are additionally 
included to control for factors specific to each SMSA that may impact upon income or growth. 
Finally, dummy variables describing the sports environment are defined. These include the 
following variables55:  
 
                                                 
54
 Coates and Humphreys (1999); p.12 
 
55
 See Coates and Humphreys (1999) 
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-) entry/exit of sports franchises 
-) presence of a sports franchise 
-) construction of sports facilities 
-) capacity of sports facilities 
 
 
The entry/exit and presence and construction of sports franchises variables are dummy 
variables describing the change in the sports environment in the past ten years. The entry/exit, 
presence and the construction variables take on a value of 1 in the year in which each of these 
events occur plus the following nine years to account for the delayed effects of each of these 
events. The variable describing the capacity of sports franchises is not a dummy variable, and 
is included in the model to investigate a possible relationship between changes in real per 
capita income and the size of a sports facility.     
 
There are a number of cases where the value of the above dummy variables is zero throughout 
the period for particular cities. This can be explained easily as stadiums or arenas tend to have 
a life cycle of more than ten years. If a facility was constructed in 1980, it would take the 
value of 0 for my research during the whole sample period. If a stadium was built in 1990, the 
construction variable would take the value 1 from 1990 to 1999 (ten years), and zero 
afterwards. Second, as opposed to the late 1960s and 1970s which were part of Coates and 
Humphreys sample period in their publication, far less relocations or entries have occurred 
since 1990. 
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4.  Results and Interpretation 
 
In this section, the results will be discussed. Table 4.1 presents variable definitions. As 
mentioned in the previous section, entry/exit, construction and presence variables take on the 
value of 1 in each of the ten years a franchise moves or a facility is constructed plus the nine 
subsequent years.  
 
Table 4.1 Variable Definitions  
Variable   Definition 
   
DPOP  Change in Population Growth Rate 
RPCPI  Real per Capita Personal Income 
GRRPCPI  Growth in Real per Capita Personal Income 
PCIBAR  Average Real per Capita Personal Income 
GRBAR  Average Growth Rate in RPCPI 
   
BACAP  Capacity of Basketball Arena 
FBCAP  Capacity of Football Stadium 
BBCAP  Capacity of Baseball Stadium 
   
BAE1  1st basketball franchise arrived 
BAE2  2nd basketball franchise arrived 
FBE1  1st football franchise arrived 
FBE2  2nd football franchise arrived 
BBE1  1st baseball franchise arrived 
BBE2  2nd baseball franchise arrived 
BAD1  1st basketball franchise left 
BAD2  2nd basketball franchise left 
FBD1  1st football franchise left 
FBD2  2nd football franchise left 
BBD1  1st baseball franchise left 
BBD2  2nd baseball franchise left 
   
BACO  basketball arena constructed 
FBCO  football stadium constructed 
BBCO  baseball stadium constructed 
BBFB  baseball/football stadium constructed 
   
BAF  basketball franchise present 
FBF  football franchise present 
BBF  baseball franchise present 
   
BAE  any basketball franchise arrived 
FBE  any football franchise arrived 
BBE  any baseball franchise arrived 
BAD  any basketball franchise left 
FBD  any football franchise left 
BBD  any baseball franchise left 
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The entry and exit variables capture the different impacts on income in each instance of 
arrival or departure. In this study, a distinction between single and multiple entry/exit is being 
made. The set of multiple entry and departure variables (BBE1, BBE2, FBE1, BAE1, BAE2, 
BBD1, BBD2, FBD1, BAD1, BAD2) allows for a differing effect on per capita income in 
each instance of an arrival or departure of a franchise; The set of single entry and departure 
variables (BBE, FBE, BAE, BBD FBD, BAD) combines multiple entries and departures, 
forcing an equal effect on each event.56 57 
 
Table 4.2 lists summary statistics for the main economic variables for each of the 30 
metropolitan areas. The population size of the metropolitan areas ranges form approximately 
1.2 million (Nashville) to 18 million (New York), per capita income ranges from roughly 
$24100 (San Antonio) to  $40700 (San Francisco) with real per capita income growth rates 
between 3.6 percent (Cleveland) to 7.5 percent (Phoenix). The small table at the bottom lists 
statistics for the average size of sports facilities - approximately 15600 for basketball arenas, 
33000 for baseball and 56000 for football stadiums. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Coates and Humphreys (1999), p.13.  
 
57
 Keep in mind that the professional sports environment in the US has changed over the last 30 years. Professional sports leagues have 
expanded, and at the same time managed to decrease the number of relocations. Broadly speaking, only a handful of franchises have 
relocated/departed to other metropolitan areas from the 1990s on, which is the period being subject to my research. Further only very few 
SMSAs host multiple professional sports franchises within the same league. The results of the single entry/exit model and the multiple 
entry/exit model will not be identical, although they might be similar, given the recent development of sports landscape and the time period 
chosen for this study.     
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Table 4.2 Mean Values 1990-2006  
City 
Population 
(in ten thousands) 
Total Personal Income         
(in millions of Dollars) 
Real per Capita 
Personal Income 
Real per capita 
Personal Income 
Growth Rate 
     
Atlanta 410.12 122537.89 29186.75 0.071 
Boston 409.30 159257.62 36575.81 0.054 
Charlotte 129.13 38519.75 29158.00 0.072 
Chicago 845.20 286198.14 31735.25 0.05 
Cincinnati 188.79 56337.54 28041.19 0.05 
Cleveland 213.85 62260.19 29123.75 0.036 
Dallas 419.12 153630.57 30071.00 0.07 
Denver 197.35 70517.46 33141.94 0.072 
Detroit 443.16 135251.89 30442.63 0.042 
Houston 463.01 144742.67 30571.38 0.068 
Indianapolis 149.71 44018.14 29035.81 0.057 
Jacksonville 110.49 30378.73 27018.75 0.066 
Los Angeles 1218.70 359383.14 29270.31 0.047 
Miami 485.34 145846.14 29623.56 0.059 
Milwaukee 149.81 45068.07 29987.13 0.047 
Minneapolis 290.00 97693.02 33269..63 0058 
Nashville 120.54 36744.96 28258.19 0.068 
New Orleans 128.62 31718.60 24874.13 0.05 
New York 1797.05 659778.60 36382.19 005 
Philadelphia 534.40 179870.01 31704.00 0.048 
Phoenix 299.39 82989.69 25732.69 0.075 
Pittsburgh 243.93 69043.77 28396.00 0.04 
Portland-Vancouver 187.56 54773.49 28764.69 0.061 
Salt Lake City 94.32 41109.99 25345.63 0.071 
San Antonio 167.51 83812.08 24123.81 0.068 
San Diego 276.38 164748.40 29978.63 0.058 
San Francisco-Oakland 401.74 24336.86 40687.00 0.059 
Seattle 296.73 100779.92 33522.63 0.061 
Tampa-St Petersburg 223.99 63406.25 26416.19 0.06 
Washington 472.01 180953.47 37790.69 0.059 
     
 
  Mean Standard Deviation  
 BBCAP 33170.78 20499.79  
 FBCAP 55908.77 28589.57  
 BACAP 15621.37 7888.29  
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4.1 Impact of the sports environment on Real Per Capita Income 
 
Table 4.3 documents the results assessing the influence of the sports environment on real per 
capita personal income. In other words, it is the estimation of equation (1). 
 
Additional variables included in the regression model include DPOP which describes the 
change in population for each metropolitan area, quadratic terms to allow for a non-linear 
relationship between capacity and per capita income (or growth) (BACAP_sq, BBCAP_sq 
and FB_sq) and L.RPCPI (L.GRRPCPI) which is the lagged level (growth rate) of real per 
capita personal income. 
 
4.1.1 Results for single entry/departure model: 
 
The dependent variable in Table 4.3 is RPCPI, real per capita personal income. In terms of the 
non-sports variables, the lag of the real per capita income (L.RPCPI) is positive and 
significant, while the change in the population has a negative and significant impact on per 
capita personal income. 
 
Turning to the sports-related variables we find a number of variables that are significant. 
Firstly, a non-linear relationship between basketball arena capacity and real per capita income 
can be observed. As indicated by the negative coefficient on the level of BACAP and the 
positive coefficient on BACAP_sq, there exists a negative relationship between arena 
capacity and income for low arena sizes, but beyond some point the impact becomes positive. 
The estimated turning point, where the marginal impact becomes positive, is found to be at a 
capacity of 30896. There are however no basketball arenas with a capacity that would indicate 
a positive impact of capacity on real per capita income as the largest arena in this dataset only 
holds 24042 people. The results do indicate however that the negative effects of stadium 
capacity are diminishing as stadium size increases. 
 
Two of the three franchise variables are significant. The presence of the basketball team is 
associated with an increase in per capita income of $1180. The presence of a football team 
however is associated with a lower per capita income of $577.   
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Three of the six entry/exit variables are significant at the 10% level or better. The entry of a 
football franchise is positive with an impact of $409 and the exit is negative with an impact of 
$525. The entry of a baseball team suggests an increase in real per capita personal income of 
almost $600.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Dependent Variable: RPCPI (single entry/departure model) 
Variable  Coefficient t-Stat. 
   
C 1270.95 3.98 
L.RPCPI 1.02 94.55 
DPOP -45160.99 -12.73 
BBCAP -10.77 -0.81 
FBCAP 17.40 1.44 
BACAP -65.50 -1.85 
BBCAP_sq 0.19 0.95 
FBCAP_sq -0.15 -1.25 
BACAP_sq 1.06 2.04 
BAF 1180.44 2.29 
FBF -577.20 -1.80 
BBF -191.83 -0.86 
BACO 78.40 0.59 
FBCO 61.24 0.43 
BBCO 42.20 0.27 
BBFB -71.52 -0.21 
BAE -203.17 -0.93 
FBE 408.50 1.82 
BBE 598.62 3.06 
BAD 184.64 0.40 
FBD -525.04 -1.70 
BBD -521.36 -1.44 
BAE1   
BAE2   
FBE1   
FBE2   
BBE1   
BBE2   
BAD1   
BAD2   
FBD1   
FBD2   
   
R_sq  0.974 
adj. R_sq  0.973 
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4.1.2 Results for multiple entry/departure model:   
 
Table 4.4 also documents the results and influence of the sports environment on real per 
capita personal income (RPCPI). This time however, the event study methodology is being 
applied. In other words, it is the estimation of equation (2) 
 
Turning immediately to the sports-related variables in Table 4.4 we again find a non-linear 
relationship between basketball capacity and per capita income with the turning point 
occurring at a capacity of 30287, so marginal impact becomes positive.   
 
The franchises variables however tell a different story. In the multiple entry model, only one 
variable, the presence of a basketball franchise, is significant. It is associated with an increase 
in real per capita personal income of $1140.  
 
The results on the entry/exit variables are also different to the previous set of results. Here, all 
entries of the first franchise of each major league sport have a significant impact and all exit 
variables are insignificant. The exit of the second basketball franchise indicates a negative 
impact on income of $670, though the coefficient is insignificant. Note that in most entry/exit 
cases, entries and exits of the second franchise of any sports will be insignificant, as Los 
Angeles and New York are the only metropolitan areas hosting two franchises competing in 
the same league. Even if a city is host to multiple major league franchises, losing all of them 
is improbable at the same time.   
 
The entry of the first basketball franchise suggests a reduction in per capita income of $460. If 
a football franchise enters a metropolitan area, it is associated with a rise in per capita income 
of almost $600, while the entry of a baseball franchise is associated with an increase in of 
$650. 
 
The overall picture obtained from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 is the following: While the entry of a 
basketball franchise has a negative impact, the presence of a basketball franchise is associated 
with a positive impact. One explanation for these results could be that while the entry initially 
causes huge costs, those might be offset after the franchise has settled and remained for a 
longer period in the same metropolitan area. Football entry initially seems to have a positive 
impact on income, but the presence of a football franchise seems to have a negative effect. 
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One possible assumption for the negative effect is that the facility of a football stadium is left 
vacant after the NFL season which is only 16 games long.  Half of the games are additionally 
played away from home, which leads to the question how long a franchise needs to be present 
in a metropolitan area in order to pay back the investments of stadiums which are commonly 
subsidized by the public. This might be one reason explaining the limited overall effect on per 
capita income resulting from the regression analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Dependent Variable: RPCPI (multiple entry/exit model) 
 
Multiple Entry/Exit Effects 
Variable Coefficient  t-Stat. 
C    
L.RPCPI 1.018  97.08 
DPOP -46756.78  -12.83 
BBCAP -11.18  -0.84 
FBCAP 15.48  1.23 
BACAP -61.18  -1.71 
BBCAP_sq 0.22  1.08 
FBCAP_sq -0.15  -1.19 
BACAP_sq 1.01  1.94 
BAF 1137.38  2.19 
FBF -472.86  -1.39 
BBF -178.00  -0.80 
BACO 118.06  0.90 
FBCO 123.29  0.86 
BBCO 31.43  0.20 
BBFB 346.99  0.84 
BAE    
FBE    
BBE    
BAD    
FBD    
BBD    
BAE1 -458.46  -1.66 
BAE2 64.17  0.18 
FBE1 599.91  2.29 
FBE2 -236.50  -0.56 
BBE1 654.57  3.05 
BBE2 0.00  0.00 
BAD1 1.03  0.00 
BAD2 -667.48  -1.29 
FBD1 -69.57  -0.16 
FBD2 -472.06  -0.87 
    
R_sq   0.974 
adj. R_sq   0.973 
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4.1.3 Results for single entry/departure - Event Study Model:  
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 investigate the effect of sports environment variables on the income in an 
event study framework. Analogous to Coates and Humphreys, the SMSA specific variables 
do have significant explanatory power, increasing the R2 of the regression from 0.84 to 0.99.  
An F-Test of the significance of these variables also indicates that there are significant 
differences among these city-specific variables. Given this, I will concentrate mainly on the 
results of the columns which take SMSA specific effects into account. 
 
Considering the final two columns of Table 4.5 in terms of the non-sports variables, the mean 
average per capita income (PCIBAR) is positive and significant.  More than half of the 
variables are significant, with absolute values above 1.75. The stadium capacity variables in 
this case tell an interesting story. These variables again indicate nonlinear relationships.  
 
Once again, the coefficients on basketball capacity indicate a negative impact on income 
initially, but a positive effect beyond a certain capacity, though the coefficients are not 
significant. The football and baseball capacity variables are significant; both suggesting an 
initial negative impact on income being offset after a certain capacity is reached.  
 
Interestingly, when SMSA specific trends were not included in the regression (Columns 1 and 
2) only the variables representing baseball capacity were significant – again indicating a non-
linear relationship. In this case however, a small stadium is associated with a rise in per capita 
income, being offset with a negative impact after the capacity reaches a certain threshold 
 
Considering the final two columns of Table 4.5 one more time, we find that the only franchise 
reporting a significant coefficient is the presence of a basketball franchise. The coefficient 
estimate suggests that the presence of a basketball franchise lowers real per capita personal 
income by almost $1700. The presence of a basketball franchise in contrast is positive and 
significant, suggesting an increase in income of more than $3600.  
 
Two of the four construction variables in the last two columns are significant. The estimated 
coefficient suggests that the construction of a multipurpose stadium will raise real per capita 
personal income by more than $2319. The construction of a baseball stadium in contrast is 
“only” associated with a rise in per capita personal income of $410. 
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None of the entry variables are significant, with t-statistics lying between 0.7 and 1 in 
absolute values, and with all coefficients indicating a negative impact of entry. Two of three 
exit variables are significant, both at the 5% level, with t-statistics above 2.  
 
The departure of a football franchise is associated with a lower per capita personal income of 
around $950 per year, while if a baseball franchise leaves the effect is to reduce income by 
$1730 per year. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Dependent Variable: RPCPI (single entry/exit - Event Study Model) 
  Common Intercept   SMSA Specific Effects 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Stat.  Coefficient t-Stat. 
C -403856.00  -4.33     
PCIBAR 0.96  34.66  0.98  73.92 
DPOP -30275.19  -3.41  -27132.93  -5.43 
BBCAP 286.70  9.44  -60.35  -1.76 
FBCAP 42.18  1.46  -69.27  -2.66 
BACAP -57.19  -0.66  -147.10  -2.74 
BBCAP_sq -3.00  -6.49  0.11  0.28 
FBCAP_sq -0.35  -1.23  0.93  3.77 
BACAP_sq 0.55  0.43  1.90  2.71 
BAF 3666.19  2.90  -1698.99  -2.16 
FBF -1622.29  -2.13  -554.60  -1.27 
BBF -2136.05  -4.04  934.93  1.06 
BACO 783.71  2.42  239.53  1.50 
FBCO 649.65  1.84  60.39  0.31 
BBCO -939.59  -2.46  410.78  1.93 
BBFB 4484.78  5.52  2319.65  4.68 
BAE -1503.98  -2.88  -334.56  -0.97 
FBE 2705.86  5.07  -293.56  -0.85 
BBE -874.26  -1.79  -544.52  -0.71 
BAD 1292.58  1.19  -456.87  -0.82 
FBD -3064.08  -4.22  -956.40  -2.20 
BBD 4690.13  5.42  -1731.11  -2.65 
BAE1        
BAE2        
FBE1        
FBE2        
BBE1        
BBE2        
BAD1        
BAD2        
FBD1        
FBD2        
        
R_sq   0.844    0.999 
adj. R_sq   0.837    0.998 
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The following observations can be made when SMSA specific trends are not included (again, 
see Column 1 and 2): In terms of construction variables, the coefficient on multipurpose 
stadiums suggests that their construction raises per capita income by $4484. This suggests that 
a cost effective sporting facility might have the potential to raise the income level of a 
metropolitan area. Further, the construction of a basketball arena is associated with a 
reduction in per capita income of $940. Further, the presence of a football franchise and 
baseball franchise are both significant and negative, suggesting a drop in income by more than 
$1600 in both cases. When SMSA specific trends are excluded, all entry variables are 
significant. The entry of both basketball and baseball franchise have negative coefficients 
whereas football entry is positive suggesting a rise in per capita income of more than $2700. 
In terms of franchise departures, the exit of a football franchise is associated with a drop in 
income by over $3000 and if a baseball franchise leaves the coefficient indicates that income 
will increase by $4690 annually.  
  
4.1.4 Results for multiple entry/departure - Event Study Model: 
 
Table 4.6 refers to the effect of sports environment variables on real per capita income, 
(RPCPI, the dependent variable) applying the event study methodology. In this particular case, 
the data describing the effects of multiple entries and exits is subject of my investigation. As 
observed in the case of single entry, we find a non-linear relationship between per capita 
income and capacity, with the effect being negative at low capacity levels. Among the 
capacity variables, the coefficient on baseball capacity is found to be not significant, which is 
the major difference between these and the results from the single entry model.  
 
As for the capacity variables, in the single entry/ exit event study model, only baseball 
capacity was significant if SMSA specific trends were omitted. In this case, we find a reverse 
nonlinear relationship between capacity and real per capita income, initially suggesting 
negative impact on per capita income until a certain threshold; Speaking of the entry and exit 
variables, none of the variables indicates the presence of a franchise being significant, but in 
terms of the coefficients the results are similar to the single entry model. The presence of 
basketball and football franchises in a metropolitan area is associated with a smaller real per 
capita income, while the presence of a baseball franchise has a positive effect on real incomes.  
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The same construction variables as in the single entry model are positive and significant at the 
5% level, the difference being the slightly larger positive effect on real per capita income in 
the multiple entry model. 
 
A baseball stadium is associated with a rise in per capita personal income of almost $460; a 
multiple purpose stadium is associated with an increase in per capita income of almost $2800, 
the magnitude of the monetary effect being quite similar to that in the single entry model.  
 
 
Table 4.6 Dependent Variable: RPCPI (multiple entry/exit - Event Study Model) 
 Multiple Entry/Exit Effects 
                     Common Intercept             SMSA Specific Effects 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Stat.  Coefficient t-Stat. 
C -5177.79  -5.56     
PCIBAR 0.99  35.74  0.98  73.41 
DPOP -27931.80  -3.06  -27366.19  -5.50 
BBCAP 274.11  9.00  -47.36  -1.33 
FBCAP 42.46  1.42  -90.70  -3.33 
BACAP -18.95  -0.21  -138.50  -2.58 
BBCAP_sq -2.82  -6.09  0.03  0.06 
FBCAP_sq -0.17  -0.55  1.05  4.19 
BACAP_sq 0.05  0.04  1.79  2.56 
BAF 3513.10  2.74  -1136.67  -1.42 
FBF -2166.96  -2.71  -678.18  -1.52 
BBF -1908.98  -3.61  876.07  1.23 
BACO 286.45  0.90  228.86  1.41 
FBCO 394.78  1.10  107.59  0.54 
BBCO -1146.53  -2.97  457.25  2.14 
BBFB 5445.73  5.80  2794.14  5.36 
BAE        
FBE        
BBE        
BAD        
FBD        
BBD        
BAE1 -2514.29  -3.80  -1152.99  -2.55 
BAE2 305.51  0.35  551.24  1.13 
FBE1 2029.82  3.18  148.37  0.35 
FBE2 1698.09  1.78  -654.43  -1.36 
BBE1 -2331.61  -4.35  -524.36  -0.96 
BBE2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
BAD1 288.82  0.26  -738.96  -1.29 
BAD2 -490.54  -0.38  -1542.74  -2.36 
FBD1 -3648.82  -3.83  -799.18  -1.52 
FBD2 -2569.42  -1.92  126.43  0.15 
        
R_sq   0.845    0.999 
adj. R_sq   0.837    0.998 
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Among the entry/exit variables, only two have significance, both at the 5% level. The entry of 
the first basketball franchise is associated with a negative income effect of approximately 
$1150. The departure of the second basketball franchise is also associated with a reduction in 
real per capita personal income, reducing income by more than $1540.  
 
Taking a look at the first two columns, we find some differences as SMSA specific trends are 
omitted. The columns show that all franchise variables are significant. The presence of a 
basketball franchise is associated with positive effects on income, raising it by more than 
$3500, while the presence of a football and baseball franchise indicate a negative impact on 
income. With respect to the construction variables, the construction of a baseball stadium is 
associated with a drop in income of almost $1150, while construction of a multi-purpose 
stadium is associated with a rise in per capita income of $5545. 
 
In terms of entry, the first basketball franchise is significant and negative, indicating a drop in 
income of more than $2500. In the case of football franchises, both the first and the second 
franchise suggest positive impacts on income, with the magnitude being in excess of $1600. 
Baseball entry however is associated with negative effects on income, lowering it by $2331. 
In terms of departure, only football variables are significant. The departure of the first 
franchise indicates a drop in income of approximately $3650 and if the second franchise 
leaves, the impact on income is to reduce it by a further $2570.   
 
 
 
4.2 Impact of the sports environment on the Growth Rate of Real Per 
Capita Personal Income 
 
4.2.1  Results assessing the impact on the Growth Rate of Real Per Capita Personal 
Income: 
 
Table 4.7 lists the results of estimating the effects of the sports environment variables on the 
growth rate of real per capita personal income (GRRPCPI).  The finding from this analysis is 
that the data obtained cannot explain or support any significant effects of sports franchises, 
both in the single and multiple entry/exit models. In this case, the lagged growth rate of real 
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per capita personal income (L.GRRPCPI) and the change in population (DPOP) account for 
the majority of the variation in the dependent variable.  
 
Among the non-sports variables, only the lag of the growth rate of real per capita personal 
income is significant and negative. In other words, a higher growth rate last year is associated 
with lower growth this year. The change in population is significant and positive, thus an 
increase in population is associated with higher growth. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Dependent Variable: GRRPCPI (entry/exit model) 
  Single Entry/Exit Effects  Multiple Entry/Exit Effects 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Stat.   Coefficient  t-Stat. 
C 0.07  8.04    0.07  8.10 
L.GRRPCPI -0.14  -2.87    -0.14  -2.80 
DPOP 0.21  1.67    0.24  1.84 
BBCAP 0.01  -1.44    -0.0007  -1.50 
FBCAP 0.0003  0.74    0.0002  0.56 
BACAP -0.001  -0.97    -0.0015  -1.21 
BBCAP_sq 0.00001  1.77    0.00001  1.82 
FBCAP_sq -0.000003  0.78    -0.000002  -0.54 
BACAP_sq 0.00001  1.05    0.00002  1.21 
BAF 0.02  1.01    0.021  1.20 
FBF -0.01  -0.92    -0.11  -0.95 
BBF 0.006  -0.79    -0.006  -0.83 
BACO 0.004  0.95    0.006  1.29 
FBCO 0.001  0.31    0.0025  0.52 
BBCO -0.002  -0.32    -0.001  -0.19 
BBFB -0.004  -0.34    -0.005  -0.39 
BAE 0.003  0.46       
FBE 0.008  1.03       
BBE 0.12  1.77       
BAD -0.008  -0.48       
FBD -0.006  -0.60       
BBD -0.02  -1.68       
BAE1       0.009  0.97 
BAE2       -0.008  -0.68 
FBE1       0.006  0.66 
FBE2       0.007  0.49 
BBE1       0.01  1.37 
BBE2       0.00  0.00 
BAD1       -0.0014  -0.09 
BAD2       -0.02  -1.17 
FBD1       -0.007  -0.47 
FBD2       -0.005  -0.25 
 
 
        
R_sq   0.069      0.072 
adj. R_sq   0.024      0.019 
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More importantly, the overall picture shows a general lack of significance of the sports 
variables. Only two variables in the single entry/exit model are significant. The entry of a 
baseball franchise is associated with an increase in the growth rate of 0.12%, and the exit of a 
baseball franchise is associated with a reduction of the growth rate by 0.02 %. In the multiple 
entry/exit model no sports environment variable has a significant coefficient, with a t-statistics 
mostly below 1. Such results lead to the conclusion that the sports environment has no 
significant impact upon the growth rate of real per capita personal income.58 
 
 
Table 4.8 reports the results of single and multiple entry/exit event studies with the growth of 
real per capita income as the dependent variable. Here, the average growth rate of income of 
all SMSAs was included in order to examine whether changes in the sports environment 
account for any discrepancy between the growth rate in a particular SMSA and the national 
average growth rate.59  For both the single and multiple entry/exit models, no variable takes a 
t-statistic greater than 1. As in Table 4.7, variables describing the sports environment in table 
4.8 have no explanatory power that would suggest an impact on the growth rate of income.   
 
One explanation why the local economy is not substantially affected by the sports 
environment might result from the effects of leakages. A big portion of a sports franchise’s 
revenue goes to player salaries and franchise employees, which usually consist of roughly 100 
members, who unlikely live in close proximity to the venue. 
The reduction in the growth rate of per capita income can be seen as a compensating effect as 
residents of “major league cities” might enjoy intangible benefits such as civic pride, etc. In 
addition, increased public spending may indicate lower growth rates of per capita personal 
income and lower infrastructure levels with lower net production, driving the results obtained. 
These monies, generated form taxes, could be used instead to build infrastructure, or invest in 
education and public health for example.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 The variable BBCAP_sq is positive and significant at the 5 % level.  
59
 Also see Coates and Humphreys (1999); p.22 
60
 Coates and Humphreys (1999), p.17-18. 
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Table 4.8 Dependent Variable: GRRPCPI (entry/exit - Event Study Model) 
 Single Entry/Exit Effects   Multiple Entry/Exit Effects 
  
     Common Intercept        SMSA Specific Effects        Common Intercept    SMSA Specific Effects 
Variable  Coefficient   t-Stat.   Coefficient  t-Stat.   Coefficient  t-Stat.  Coefficient t-Stat. 
C -0.001  -0.16        -0.0006  -0.07     
GRBAR 0.988  12.05  0.991  11.95    0.99  12.02  0.995  11.94 
DPOP 0.308  3.05  0.068  0.51    0.33  3.13  0.061  0.45 
BBCAP -0.0003  -0.96  0.0005  0.5    -0.0004  -1.01  0.0004  0.37 
FBCAP 0.0003  0.84  -0.0004  -0.64    0.0002  0.69  -0.0004  -0.51 
BACAP -0.0003  -0.34  0.0006  0.41    -0.0005  -0.53  0.0006  0.44 
BBCAP_sq 0.000006  1.13  -0.000006  -0.06    0.000006  1.17  -0.000003  -0.03 
FBCAP_sq -0.0000036  -0.93  0.000006  0.84    -0.000002  -0.76  0.000005  0.83 
BACAP_sq 0.000007  0.47  -0.000005  -0.26    0.000008  0.59  -0.000005  -0.28 
BAF 0.006  0.43  0.009  0.46    0.009  0.60  0.007  0.31 
FBF -0.008  -0.89  -0.01  -0.9    -0.008  -0.82  -0.011  -0.93 
BBF -0.004  -0.67  0.011  0.47    -0.004  -0.71  -0.003  -0.15 
BACO 0.004  1.19  0.003  0.73    0.005  1.38  0.003  0.65 
FBCO 0.003  0.76  0.0009  0.17    0.003  0.89  -0.00003  -0.01 
BBCO -0.002  -0.41  -0.005  -0.86    -0.001  -0.30  -0.005  -0.87 
BBFB -0.004  -0.45  0.00004  0    -0.008  -0.75  -0.007  -0.49 
BAE -0.0001  -0.02  -0.004  -0.41           
FBE 0.006  0.94  0.008  0.91           
BBE 0.009  1.65  -0.013  -0.63           
BAD -0.006  -0.51  -0.001  -0.65           
FBD -0.005  -0.57  0.009  0.76           
BBD -0.012  -1.23  -0.013  -0.74           
BAE1           0.005  0.72  -0.0006  -0.05 
BAE2           -0.009  -0.95  -0.006  -0.46 
FBE1           0.005  0.65  0.005  0.44 
FBE2           0.009  0.81  0.016  1.26 
BBE1           0.009  1.54  0.002  0.11 
BBE2           0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00 
BAD1           -0.002  -0.16  -0.009  -0.59 
BAD2           -0.009  -0.59  -0.014  -0.77 
FBD1           -0.007  -0.66  -0.0005  -0.03 
FBD2           0.005  0.33  0.019  0.86 
R_sq   0.282    0.801      0.284    0.801 
adj. R_sq   0.249    0.777      0.247    0.776 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
The objective of this research was to give insight into how the sports environment is affecting 
the economy of a metropolitan area. Interactions between leagues, franchise owners and the 
public sector were briefly discussed in order to provide a better understanding of the 
mechanisms and forces that lead to subsidies or eventual relocations of sports franchises.  
 
In the past, league and industry-sponsored studies have forecasted that sports franchises, 
facilities and events increase economic activity by hundreds of millions of dollars and thus 
affect income positively. The regression analysis I have conducted did not deliver distinctive 
results to support these claims. Therefore my research also supports previous academic papers 
which generally find little or no positive impact of the professional sports environment on in 
terms of new net jobs created or per capita income the respective local economies. 
 
Generally, sports facilities with big capacities seem to affect income positively rather than 
small capacity venues as mostly a non linear relationship between capacity and per capita 
income could be observed. The construction of a small capacity venue is associated with a 
reduction in income. Once the capacity reaches a certain threshold however, the sporting 
facilities are associated with a positive impact on income. Baseball and football stadiums 
usually are constructed beyond that threshold point. Based on my observations, however, 
basketball arenas seem to be too small to suggest a positive impact on real per capita personal 
income. For pure normative reasons, it is plausible that a bigger venue has more opportunity 
to generate bigger cash flows resulting from larger admission revenues.  
 
Additionally, construction of a multipurpose stadium is associated with a boost in per capita 
income by more than $2000. Thus it seems more reasonable to build multi purpose facilities 
instead of single use facilities which have been more common in the past 15 to 20 years. 
 
Even if the results are not consistent with observations obtained by Brad Humphreys and 
Dennis Coates in 1998, I was not able to find indicators for a significantly huge positive 
impact of the sports environment in respect to the real per capita personal income among the 
sampled areas. Based on the time period and metropolitan areas I used for my sample, some 
franchises do positively affect real per capita income. Still, the general picture does not 
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indicate a substantial positive economic impact of sports franchises and facilities as advocates 
and proponents of stadium construction want the public to believe. Further, I found that the 
sports environment has no impact on the growth rate of per capita personal income. 
 
To make public investments pay off in the long run when sports franchises are subsidized, 
sports facilities should meet the requirements to host hundreds of events each year as is the 
case with the Staples Centre in Los Angeles. Further, it also should be an anchor for 
commercial and residential development of an entire section of a city. Los Angeles is one of 
the few cities where the sports environment has actually had a positive impact on the local 
economy. The Staples Centre in downtown Los Angeles is used by two NBA franchises, the 
L.A Lakers and the L.A Clippers and further by another major league franchise, the Los 
Angeles Kings, who are a member of the NHL. Besides that it can be also utilized as an event 
hall, where annually more than 250 events take place. The Staples Centre attracts over four 
millions of paid admissions each year, setting an example of how sporting facilities can 
generate positive economic impact for a local economy61.  
 
If these or similar criteria cannot be met, public monies being spent for municipal services 
might be more useful to enhance real per capita income and thus improve the economy of the 
metropolitan area. However, economic scholars acknowledge the intangible benefits 
generated by sports franchises. If professional sports teams enhance the quality of life in a 
metropolitan area such as parks and museums, local politicians should decide whether to 
attract sports teams by offering subsidies. This, however, is subject to future studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 Los Angeles, San Diego, Indianapolis are recent examples where new facilities had positive impact on the economy of a district. In Los 
Angeles, the Staples Center was built as a part of a multi billion dollar entertainment project to redevelop the downtown district. The success 
of this plan is underscored by the fact that even at the height of mortgage and credit crisis in the U.S in 2007, commercial rents in downtown 
Los Angeles were still rising and attracting tenants from other parts of the county. See Rosentraub (n.a), Source: 
www.edmonton.ca/city_government/documents/CityGov/RosentraubReport.pdf 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
 
in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika nehmen Metropolen große Summen auf sich, um 
professionelle Sportvereine zu subventionieren bzw. in ihre Städte zu locken. Aus diesem 
Grund wurden in den letzten 20 Jahren über 20 Milliarden US Dollar in Stadien und 
Sporthallen investiert. In den meisten Fällen übernahm der öffentliche Sektor etwa 60% der 
Kosten, die sich je nach Einrichtung zwischen 175 und 300 Millionen US Dollar belaufen. 
 
Analysen, die der Existenz professioneller US amerikanischer Sportvereine, der Major 
League Franchises, in Städten und Metropolen positive ökonomische Effekte subsumierten, 
hatten bisher diese Investitionen legitimiert. Jedoch konnten zahlreiche unabhängige 
akademische Studien keine positive wirtschaftliche Auswirkung mit der Existenz von Major 
League Franchises in Verbindung setzten. In den meisten Fällen wirkte sich ein 
professioneller Sportverein negativ auf das Einkommen aus. Die Schaffung eines einzigen 
Arbeitsplatzes im Profisportbereich verursacht Kosten von etwa 200000 US Dollar, ein Wert 
der die durchschnittlichen Arbeitsplatzschaffungskosten bei weitem übertrifft. Es stellt sich 
daher die Frage nach der wirtschaftlichen Sinnhaftigkeit solcher Investitionen, wenn diese 
Gelder in den Bildungsbereich oder beispielsweise in Infrastruktur fließen könnten. 
 
Der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit liegt darin, die Existenz von Major League Franchises und 
deren Auswirkung auf das reale pro Kopf Einkommen von Einwohnern in 30 US 
amerikanischen Städten im Zeitraum von 1990 – 2006 an Hand eines Regressionsmodells zu 
erforschen. Die Resultate dieser Studie unterstützen grundsätzlich die Ergebnisse 
vorhergehender akademischer Studien. Keine signifikanten Effekte auf das reale pro Kopf 
Einkommen noch auf dessen Wachstumsrate konnte festgestellt werden.  
 
Trotz dieser Erkenntnisse kämpfen viele amerikanische Metropolen um die Gunst der Major 
League Franchises. Möglicherweise wird jenen Institutionen ein positiver Effekt unterstellt, 
der monetär nicht erfasst werden kann. Dies stellt jedoch ein Diskussionsthema für zukünftige 
Forschungen dar. 
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